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Using modern growth theory, we estimate Colombian total-factor productivity 
relative to the United Kingdom’s for the last 200 years in order to match 
observed income differences. Our results show Colombia’s remarkably 
inefficient use of technology relative to a country that is a leader in this 
regard and provide quantitative estimates of the proximate causes of 
relative income differences between the two economies.
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1.  introduction
Over the last 200 years, Colombian living standards (per capita real 
gross domestic product, or RGDP) have not improved relative to 
leading developed economies. There has been growth but no catch-up, 
as is evident from Figure 1, which shows Colombian RGDP relative 
to RGDP of the U.K. since the beginning of the 19th century.
1 This 
characteristic is shared by many developing countries and is a stylized 
fact that has motivated a great deal of research on economic growth. 
In this paper, we measure and highlight the proximate causes of this 
relative stagnation, as a prerequisite for a disciplined exploration of 
the fundamental causes of this phenomenon. The paper focuses on 
the role of technology and Colombian use of this technology relative 
to a country that is a leader in this regard.
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figure 1. relative per capita rgdP between Colombia and 
united Kingdom
In order to do so, we first document the development pattern of 
Colombia relative to countries that are now industrialized economies. 
Using modern growth theory, we measure Colombia’s total-factor 
productivity (TFP) relative to an artificial benchmark economy and 
the growth experience of the U.K. The model is an extension of Hansen 
and Prescott (2002) and has several virtues. First, by endogenizing some 
key macroeconomic variables such as capital, we are able to estimate 
relative TFP without using capital (which is difficult to estimate for 
the 19th century). Second, our results are general equilibrium outcomes. 
In this model, TFP today affects implied TFP tomorrow through 
the process of capital accumulation, consumption and fertility rates. 
Third, it tells a unified albeit oversimplified story of the transition 
from constant living standards (Malthusian economy) and the process 
of industrialization to modern, sustained growth (Solow’s model of 
economic growth).
There is a growing line of literature focusing on long-run patterns 
and models of growth starting from the eve of industrialization 
through modern, sustained economic growth of developed economies 
(Lucas 2002). Likewise, there is a vast body of literature focusing on 
the determinants of growth -- proximate and fundamental causes -- 
some of which is largely focused on explaining relative income levels 
among countries. Our paper is part of this body of literature and 
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economic growth over the last 200 years. There is obviously a growing 
and important literature on Colombia’s long-run economic history 
(Urrutia and Robinson, 2007; Meisel and Ramírez, 2010), most of 
which consists of descriptive, qualitative or conceptual efforts to 
understand Colombia’s long-run development pattern.
2 However, 
this is probably the first paper that, arguably from a very simplified 
perspective, studies Colombian long-run growth within a structural 
and quantitative model of the Colombian economy. Despite its 
limitations, we hope the results of this paper bring to the forefront of 
literature on Colombian economic history some important quantitative 
questions to be solved by future research.
Our main result is an estimation of Colombia’s total-factor productivity 
over the last 200 years relative to an industrialized leader, the United 
Kingdom. We show that in order to explain Colombia’s relative 
income stagnation, TFP differences must be substantial. To explain 
how industrialization in Colombia (which occurred around 1910) was 
delayed almost 75 years after industrialization in England (at the 
beginning of the 19th century) requires a TFP difference between 
0.57 and 0.79; and explaining the income differences in the 20th 
century requires TFP differences to be around 0.51 for the first half 
of the century and 0.86 for the second half. In Section 5 we provide 
an interpretation of these results.
The paper is organized as follows. Following this introduction there 
are four more sections. The second section highlights key stylized facts 
about the long-run economic growth of the United Kingdom, the United 
States and Colombia. We take these salient features as restrictions for 
our modeling framework. The third section briefly describes the model, 
in particular the main difference with the Hansen and Prescott (2002) 
model. The fourth section presents the results and the fifth section 
provides a tentative explanation and concluding remarks. Finally, the 
Appendix provides references to all of the data used.
2.  Patterns of long-run growth
According to economic historians, before the 19th century per capita 
RGDP was almost constant in all countries (i.e., income and population 
grew at the same rate), population growth was low, real salaries were 
2.  See also Greco (2002) for an attempt to construct Colombian economic series for the 20th century.184 LATIN AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | Vol. 48 No. 2 (Nov., 2011), 181–198
constant and correlated with population shocks, land was an important 
factor of production and technological progress was slow (Mokyr, 
1990, and Lucas, 2002). We call this economic state a Malthusian 
economy. Then, on the eve of the 19th century, Europe underwent a 
dramatic change in all aspects of society. The industrial revolution 
that started in England in the late 18th century may be the most 
important event affecting economic and social life over the last 200 
years. Before the industrial revolution, the main economic indicators 
were as described in the previous paragraph. After the industrial 
revolution, some countries began to grow at unprecedented rates. As 
a consequence and/or simultaneously, population growth rates and 
real wages increased substantially. Since then, similar growth patterns 
characterize today’s industrialized economies. 
Although this development pattern first took place in England at the 
end of the 18th century, it has spread slowly to many other developing 
countries, and according to some authors will be experienced, sooner 
or later, by almost every country (Lucas, 2002). According to this 
literature, the stylized fact of long-run development is the transition 
from the Malthusian economy to a modern industrialized economy 
or a Solow economy. From the point of view of this study, the most 
salient feature of the latter is the sustained and constant growth 
of living standards. More precisely, RGDP and real wages grow at 
a constant rate that is equal to the rate of growth of technological 
progress. These and other regularities documented as Kaldor stylized 
facts have a standard rationalization in the Solow growth model.
3 
Therefore, and following Hansen and Prescott (2002), we take this 
pattern of a Malthusian economy followed by a transition to a Solow 
economy as our basic long-run growth pattern.
Given that this transition has taken place in different countries at 
various times in history, it comes as no surprise that the uneven pace 
of the industrial revolution has given rise to an enormous inequality 
in living standards as measured in terms of per capita RGDP. We 
follow Parente and Prescott (2000) and many others in explaining these 
income differences as the consequence of inefficient use of technology 
relative to a technological frontier. 
Finally, another important feature during this transition, as documented 
by Lucas (2002) is the so-called demographic transition, which consists 
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of a pattern of low population growth rates followed by very rapid 
transitions to higher growth rates and, finally, a return to lower rates.
Figures 2 to 6 illustrate some of these long-run patterns of economic 
growth. Figure 2 shows U.S. and U.K. per capita RGDP, population 
and real wages over the last 200 years. Both per capita RGDP and 
real wages tell similar stories. During the 19th century, U.S. per 
capita RGDP grew very little (Malthusian economy). Then, at the 
beginning of the 20th century, there was a structural change in per 
capita RGDP and real wage growth rates. This pattern coincides with 
U.S. economic history and the basic facts mentioned previously. During 
the Malthusian period, per capita RGDP and real wages were almost 
constant, and then after a transition period the economy evolved 
into a Solow industrialized economy where per capita RGDP and 
wages grow at the same rate as the rate of growth of TFP. In terms 
of those same variables, the U.K.’s economic history is similar but 
leads the U.S. economy by between 80 and 100 years. That is, the 
U.K. is a Malthusian economy at the beginning of the 19th century, 
then makes a major transition towards a modern industrialized 
economy that is well described as a Solow economy. In terms of 
the demographic transition, the story is very different. On the one 
hand, the U.K. follows a pattern that is largely consistent with 
the stylized fact mentioned previously: a period of low population 
growth followed by a substantial increase in population growth and 
finally a relative low population growth rate. Moreover, this pattern 
is consistent with the view of Lucas (2002) of a radical change in 
fertility rates on the eve of the Industrial Revolution. On the other 
hand, the U.S population growth rates in the 19th century reflect 
greater immigration rather that a change in fertility rates. U.S 
economic history locates its demographic transition in the middle 
of the 20th century, well after the U.S. started is industrialization 
process and for very different reasons.
Figure 3 shows an interesting historical fact. While the U.K. historically 
took the lead in terms of technological change and per capita RGDP 
growth, the U.S. began to catch up in the second half of the 19th 
century, and by the end of the first quarter of the 20th century it had 
already taken the lead in terms of income per capita. This suggests 
that our estimation of relative TFP differences between Colombia 
and the U.K. over the last 200 years is a lower bound to relative TFP 
differences between Colombia and the U.S. for the same period and 
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Studying Colombia’s long-run economic development in terms of the 
same dimensions, we find several interesting features that are consistent 
with our model. Figure 4 shows Colombian per capita RGDP over the 
last 200 years. The transition from a Malthusian economy (constant 
living standards) to a Solow economy is obvious. In terms of per capita 
RGDP, sustained growth began early in the 20th century, which is 
consistent with historical accounts of Colombian industrialization. In 
terms of real wages, shown in Figure 6, the message is similar though 
figure 3. relative per capita rgdP  
between united states and united Kingdom
figure 4. Colombia's per capita rgdP
(2005 U.S dollars)188 LATIN AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | Vol. 48 No. 2 (Nov., 2011), 181–198
not as clear at least regarding real wages at the beginning of the 20th 
century. Nevertheless, there may be several good reasons why real wages 
behave slightly differently than what we would expect from the Solow 
growth model. First, real wages data are constructed by averaging (see 
the Appendix) over many sources of nominal data that are not very 
reliable. Second, and most importantly, at the beginning of the 20th 
century Colombia (1899-1902) experienced a devastating civil war that 
figure 5. smoothed Colombian population growth rate
figure 6. smoothed Colombian real wages index189 A.J. Riascos | TWO HUNDRED YEARS OF COLOMBIAN ECONOMIC GROWTH
laid the ground for the separation of what is today the country of 
Panamá. Known as the Guerra de los Mil Días (the 1,000 Day War), 
this civil war significantly disrupted Colombia’s economic and social 
life. In any case, it is apparent from Figure 6 that if one smoothes out 
the data from the first 10 or 20 years of the 20th century, real wages 
grow at a constant rate very much in line with the predictions of the 
Solow growth model.
Finally, and particularly interesting from our modeling framework, the 
demographic transition is a salient feature of Colombian demographics 
in the 20th century. First, during the 19th century, growth rates were 
low. Following the industrialization of the Colombian economy 
at the beginning of the 20th century, the population growth rate 
increased and only began to fall back to low levels after the 1960s. 
Second, as opposed to the previously mentioned stylized facts of 
long-run growth according to which the demographic transition 
was almost simultaneous with increases in living standards, in 
Colombia such an increase did not take place until several decades 
after industrialization. Third, the demographic transition in our 
model matches quite well the Colombian experience rather than 
the previously mentioned stylized facts about industrializations and 
demographic transitions as documented in Lucas (2002).
3.  The model
Hansen and Prescott (2002) define a Malthusian economy as one with 
constant per capita RGDP (i.e., income and population grow at the same 
rate), a low population growth rate, almost constant real salaries that 
are negatively correlated with population shocks and an intensive use 
of a fixed factor of production (land). On the other hand, by a Solow 
economy we mean an economy characterized by sustained per capita 
real GDP growth that matches the rate of growth of technological 
innovation, exogenous technological progress and real wages that grow 
at the rate of per capita RGDP. Our working hypothesis is that per 
capita income differences may be explained by relative TFP (efficient 
use of technology relative to the technological frontier).
Our model is the same as Hansen and Prescott except for the 
introduction of a total factor productivity parameter that we calibrate 
from observable time series of per capita RGDP. We refer the reader to 
Hansen and Prescott for most of the details while focusing here only 190 LATIN AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | Vol. 48 No. 2 (Nov., 2011), 181–198
on the way we have modified and applied their model. The model is a 
two-period OLG model that will run for six periods. Every period has 
duration of 35 years and fertility depends on the current to Malthus 
consumption. The functional form matches Lucas (2002) and Hansen 
and Prescott (2002) and is given by:
= + NN gc c (/ ) tt tM 1
where Nt is population in period t, ct is current consumption (relative 
to output) and cM is steady-state consumption in a Malthusian economy 
(relative to output). Every period there are two available technologies, 
a Malthus technology and a Solow technology. Whether one or both 
are used depends on profits and capital-labor allocation between 
sectors. The only difference between our model and that of Hansen 
and Prescott is reflected in the following specifications of technologies 
in both sectors.
4 The Malthusian sector production technology is:
γ =
φµ φµ −− YAKNL Mt Mt M
t
Mt Mt Mt ,,,, ,
1
where YM,t
 is output using Malthusian technology, AM,t
 is TFP in the 
Malthusian sector, KM,t and NM,t
 are capital and labor respectively, 
and LM,t
 is land. In the Solow sector, we assume that production 
technology takes the form:
γ =
θθ − YA KN St St S
t
St St ,, ,,
1
where YS,t is output using Solow technology, AS,t is TFP in the Solow 
sector and KS,t and NS,t are capital and labor, respectively.
We assume that these technologies are common to all countries except 
for the level of TFP, AM,t and AS,t. Now, regarding the calibration 
of the model, we use Hansen and Prescott (2002) calibration for all 
parameters except for TFP.
5 That is, the calibration is consistent 
and determined by a few long-run growth facts of the U.K. economy: 
population growth in the Malthus era, growth rate of TFP in the 
postwar United States (this is TFP growth rate of the technological 
leader), capital and labor shares in the Malthus period and the capital 
4.  Notice that although Hansen and Prescott set up the model in this more general form, they don’t 
solve the model but normalize total factor productivity to one.
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share in Solow technology based on factor shares in the postwar United 
States. Now, our goal is to model per capita RGDP between Colombia 
and the U.K. imposing certain restrictions, all of which are illustrated 
in Figure 7. First, in examining Colombian-U.K. relative RGDP 
over the last 200 years, there are 5 vertical lines in the figure. Each 
represents a period in our model (35 years). Then, on the horizontal 
axis there are two time lines. In each one of them the period between 
t = 0 and t = 1 represents the first time that the Solow technology 
begins to be used in each country. This marks the very beginning of 
industrialization. Only by the end of the period, after 35 years, does 
the Solow technology play a dominant role and it is at this time we 
can say that industrialization has taken place. For the U.K., that 
corresponds to somewhere around 1840 and for Colombia it is around 
1910, based on the rate of growth of RGDP in each country (figures 
2 and 4) as explained before. These two periods are highlighted by 
vertical lines representing U.K. and Colombian industrialization. So 
far, we have placed two broad restrictions on our model. On the one 
hand, it must reproduce relative per capita RGDP between the two 
countries for the whole period and second, it must be consistent with 
the timing of industrialization in both countries (around 1840 for the 
U.K. and around 1910 for Colombia). For simplicity’s sake, we have 
made our model consistent with the average relative income differences 
figure 7. facts to be explained: relative income differences 
and timing of industrialization in Colombia and 
united Kingdom192 LATIN AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | Vol. 48 No. 2 (Nov., 2011), 181–198
between the two countries during the Colombian Malthusian period 
and thereafter we match relative income differences in the next two 
periods (1910 - 1945 and 1945 - 1980). That is, we match the Malthus 
average income difference between the two countries of 0.18, illustrated 
by a horizontal line in Figure 7. These restrictions allow us to estimate 
relative TFP in each sector, Malthus and Solow, for the periods of 
study as explained below.
4.  results
We first notice that the benchmark calibration where total factor 
productivity is normalized to one as in Hansen and Prescott (2002) 
underestimates output per capita compared to the U.K. experience over 
the last 200 years. Therefore, the relative TFP differences estimated 
in our model will underestimate the real relative TFP differences.
6 
We first calibrated relative TFP between U.K. and Colombia in the 
Malthusian sector in order to match observed income differences between 
the two economies when both are in their Malthusian steady state.
Next, notice that the dynamics of income per capita and real wages 
in Colombia underwent a significant change around 1910. Therefore, 
we calibrate relative TFP in the Solow sector in such a way that it is 
only in 1910 that the Solow technology starts to dominate. Basically, 
this event relies on proposition 2 in Hansen and Prescott (2002). Our 
interpretation suggests that these are the technological differences that 
would explain why Colombia’s industrialization occurred 70 years after 
the U.K.’s industrialization. Once Solow technology starts operating 
in the Colombian economy, we estimate TFP differences by matching 
relative per capita RGDP for two more periods in the model. That 
is, average relative per capita RGDP between Colombia and the U.K. 
for the 1910-1945 period and for the 1945-1980 period.
We examine UK industrialization as a phenomenon starting in 1840 
(which was the first time the Solow technology became dominant). 
This is because when one looks at the data, income per capita in the 
U.K. was rather constant until 1842. In fact, in 1801, U.K. income per 
capita was about 2,515 PPP-adjusted 2005 U.S. dollars while in 1842, 
6.  Formally we set the productivity parameters of the industrial leader to 1 (UK in our exercise). We 
then estimate AM,t and AS,t for the follower (Colombia) in order to match relative income differences 
between the two countries. Since normalizing the leader’s total factor productivity parameters to 1 
underestimates the true income level of the leader during the last two hundred years, our estimate of 
relative TFP will also be underestimated.193 A.J. Riascos | TWO HUNDRED YEARS OF COLOMBIAN ECONOMIC GROWTH
it was about 1,695. From then on, the U.K. embarked on a period of 
sustained growth. In order to match the relative income per capita 
in the U.K. prior to industrialization (the Malthusian period roughly 
before 1840) with the Colombian pre-industrialization period which 
was roughly before 1910 (the Colombian Malthusian period), we need 
relative efficiency of both sectors to be 0.38. That is, our first result 
shows that Colombia’s productivity during the Malthusian period was 
at most 0.38 of U.K. productivity during its Malthusian period. Since 
in both economies during the Malthusian period only the Malthusian 
technology is being used, this productivity difference corresponds to 
differences in the Malthusian production technology.
To delay Colombian industrialization, the profitable operation of a 
Solow technology, we require that productivity differences between the 
U.K. and Colombia be less than 0.79 and higher than 0.57. The first 
number is an upper bound for relative productivity differences in order 
to delay Colombian industrialization by 70 years. Had productivity 
differences been lower, Colombian industrialization would have taken 
place before 1910. The second number bounds relative productivity 
inefficiency between Solow sectors in both countries. Had productivity 
inefficiency been greater, industrialization would have taken place after 
1910. The interval reflects the time discreteness of our model. When 
industrialization begins in Colombia we set the relative inefficiency of 
the Malthusian sector in both countries at 0.38. Although this is not 
necessarily the case for the 1910 - 1980 period it allows us to focus on 
technological differences in the Solow sector. The results should not be 
very sensitive to this assumption since Solow technologies very quickly 
make up most of the share of total output. We then carry on the exercise 
of matching relative income per capita in both countries for the next 
two periods after industrialization begins. For the 1910-1945 period 
we estimate Colombian productivity in the Solow sector to be 0.51 of 
U.K. productivity in the Solow sector. For the 1945-1980 period the 
same exercise gives 0.86. Our main results are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1. relative TfP between Colombia and uK
sector before 1910 between 1910 - 1945 between 1945 - 1980
Malthus 0.38a 0.38 0.38
Solow [0.57, 0.79] 0.51 0.86
a. Estimated to be consitent with pre-industrialization relative income per capita194 LATIN AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | Vol. 48 No. 2 (Nov., 2011), 181–198
5.  interpretation and concluding remarks
Colombia’s economic growth has been the subject of numerous 
studies. However, unlike most specialized literature on the subject, 
this paper uses a well-defined economic model as a tool to measure the 
proximate causes of Colombia’s income differences relative to the U.K. 
In particular, the main focus is on measuring technological differences 
that, given the results presented, provide some valuable lessons and 
more prominently, guidance for future research. In the literature on 
Colombia’s economic history, there are two dominant approaches. On 
the one hand, there are very focused studies that describe and measure 
relevant growth determinants such as trade, transportation costs, 
political institutions, etc. (an example is Meisel and Ramírez, 2010), 
and on the other hand, there are more general and descriptive studies 
such as those in well-known books on Colombian economic history. In 
all of this literature, the authors provide compelling arguments why 
various factors are key determinants of economic growth. For example, 
Ocampo (2010) in Meisel and Ramírez (2010) argues that the weak 
capacity of the Colombian economy to develop core export products 
may be essentially responsible for Colombia’s slow economic growth 
in the 19th century.
7 Although compelling, the study provides no 
estimate of the extent to which it is responsible and how exactly this 
could explain Colombia’s poor growth. Consider also the comments 
in Kalmanovitz (2010) who argues that if Colombia performed well in 
the second half of the 19th century, this was due to favorable terms 
of trade.
8 In his conclusions to Chapter 2, Kalmanovitz argues that 
liberal reforms such as openness to trade, simplification of the tax 
structure, fiscal federalism and private banking had positive growth 
effects. Again, the arguments are compelling, but it is hard to know 
their relative importance, which would be very valuable in the design 
of economic policy. Now, this paper highlights the role of TFP and 
its inefficient use as a key determinant of Colombia’s economic 
performance in relation to an industrialized leader. In light of these 
results, I argue that some of these explanations may be of secondary 
importance since it is difficult to link some of the arguments mentioned 
previously and the efficient use of technology. It is in this sense that 
our model disciplines and guides the discussion by making a case 
for arguments that help to explain technological inefficiencies. For 
7.  Chapter 4, pp. 200 of Meisel and Ramírez (2010).
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example, the important role played by the tobacco export industry 
in the second half of the 19th century after many years of state 
monopoly is widely recognized by economic historians. It was only in 
1850 that this monopoly was abolished in favor of greater competition 
and private entrepreneurship. This historical fact hints at the role of 
competition policy in economic efficiency. A more obvious guess is 
related to traditional views on what affects technological progress, such 
as human capital, appropriate institutions and exogenous conditions 
such as geography and particularly topography.
According to Maloney (2002), citing Mariscal and Sokoloff (2000), the 
literacy rate in the United States was around 80% and 90% in 1870 
and 1970, respectively, while for most Latin American countries the 
same statistics were below 20% and 75%. As pointed out by Ramírez 
and Salazar (2010), by the middle of the 19th century, Colombia’s 
educational level, measured in terms of years of primary schooling, was 
one of the worst in the world. Primary schooling attainment in the 
United States was around 20%, in Holland and the United Kingdom 
it was around 10% while in Colombia it was below 2%. Even more 
dramatic are the differences in technical education measured in terms 
of engineers per 100,000 workers. Maloney (2002), citing several studies, 
reports that in the United States in 1920 there were 128 engineers 
per 100,000 workers, while Sweden had 84 in 1887 and Colombia had 
just eight in that same year. 
Regarding the appropriateness of institutions, there is vast literature 
that highlights the importance of private property, political institutions, 
and other institutions for economic growth. Although this paper is not 
the place to link this literature to what we believe may be important 
determinants of technological progress, we would like to suggest that 
political instability and continuous civil conflict are likely to have been 
important determinants of Colombia’s relative stagnation. Even by Latin 
American standards, Colombia has been an exceptionally politically 
unstable country. During the 19th century, there were 13 constitutional 
amendments or reforms while countries such as Chile or Argentina 
experienced seven. Moreover, civil conflicts have been particularly violent 
and costly. For example, citing Aníbal Galindo in Kalmanovitz (2010), 
the civil conflict known as the Guerra de los Supremos (1841 - 1843), 
wiped out half of the country’s agricultural production.
Finally, an essential point of our case for looking at explanations that are 
most likely related to technological progress are the special characteristics 196 LATIN AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | Vol. 48 No. 2 (Nov., 2011), 181–198
of Colombian geography and in particular its topography. Colombia’s 
landscape has been an important determinant of transportation costs 
(Safford, 2010). For example, Bertola and Williamson (2006) report 
that by the middle of the 19th century, Bogotá, one of Latin America’s 
largest capital cities, had the highest transportation costs when 
measured as the cost of transporting one ton from England to one of 
these cities. Therefore, our interpretation is that, to the extent that 
the estimations presented in this paper point in the right direction 
in terms of prioritizing the main determinants of Colombian growth 
over the last 200 years in comparison to an industrial leader such as 
the U.K., the key variables to blame for the longstanding stagnation 
of relative income per capita are human capital, civil conflict, the 
institutional framework and topography.197 A.J. Riascos | TWO HUNDRED YEARS OF COLOMBIAN ECONOMIC GROWTH
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aPPendiX. data sources
■ ■ Figure 1: Colombia and U.K. RGDP in 2005 dollars, PPP-adjusted. 
Colombian RGDP is from Kalmanovitz for the 1805-1905 period 
and Greco (2002) for the 1905-2005 period. Due to methodological 
differences in the construction of both series, levels in Greco 
were backfilled to 1805 using the rates of change of RGDP in 
Kalmanovitz. U.K. data was taken from Lawrence H. Officer’s 
Measuringworth: http://www.measuringworth.com/ukgdp/. Both 
series were expressed in 2005 dollars (PPP-adjusted) using the 
PPP-adjusted exchange rates found in Penn World Table 6.3.
■ ■ Figure 2: Data taken from Lawrence H. Officer’s Measuringworth: 
http://www.measuringworth.com/ukgdp/.
■ ■ Figure 4: Colombian RGDP is based on Greco (2002). Since 
this source only contains RGDP from 1905 to 2000, we used the 
DANE official statistics to complete the series up to 2005. We 
used the DANE implicit price deflator to express RGDP in 2005 
Colombian pesos and then we used Penn World Tables PPP-
adjusted exchange rate to express everything in 2005 U.S. dollars.
■ ■ Figure 5: 19th century population figures are taken from the 
1825, 1835, 1843, 1851, 1864, 1870, 1887 and 1898 censuses 
(Florez, Romero, 2008). From 1905 to 1997 the data is from 
Greco. From 1998 to 2005 the data is from the DANE censuses 
and official estimates. All missing values were completed using 
linear interpolation. Smoothing was done using a Hodrick-Prescott 
filter with smoothing parameter t = 100.
■ ■ Figure 6: Wages for the 19th century were taken from Urrutia 
(2007). This source included peasants’ salaries from Bank of 
Bogotá and mints and postal service offices in Bogotá and 
Popayan. A geometric mean was used to aggregate the data. 
The series for the first half of the 20th century was provided by 
María del Pilar López’s data set; the data for the second half of 
the 20th century was provided by Urrutia and Ruíz (2010) and 
consisted in an index built with salaries from industry, public 
services, construction, commerce, transport and communications, 
financial services and educational services. Data for the 21st 
century were taken from DANE. All missing values were completed 
using linear interpolation. Smoothing was done using a Hodrick-
Prescott filter with smoothing parameter t = 100.